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ABSTRACT 
This paper analyses the Electoral Integrity Amendment Bill 1999 No. 3-1 as likely to be 
amended by the Supplementary Order Paper number 177. The paper argues that this Bill should not 
be made law for three reasons; it is an ineffective, unnecessary and undesirable Bill. 
The change from First Past the Post (FPP) to Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) 
Government has meant that the operation of Government and the relationship between Parliament 
and the Executive has become more unpredictable. It is argued that the primary purpose of the Bill is 
to make Government more predictable. This paper suggests that a certain level of unpredictability is 
desirable, as it ensures better government and stable policy. 
The Bill has two stated purposes, to increase the integrity of Parliament and maintain the 
proportional distribution of seats within Parliament. This paper argues that the Bill will not be 
effective in achieving these two goals. The nature of MMP Government is complex; this paper 
demonstrates that a wide range of factors influence the public ' s perception of the electoral system, 
and the proportional distribution of seats within Parliament. This Bill is ineffective in accounting for 
all these factors . 
My second argument that in any event, the Bill is now unnecessary, party hopping is a self-
correcting problem. The current mechanism of the triennial election is the most appropriate means of 
sanctioning MP' s behaviour. And there has been no party hopping during the second MMP 
Parliament. 
My third argument is that this particular legislation is undesirable. The effect of the Bill is 
to reduce the ability of MPs to act independently within the House, and therefore removes an 
important constraint on Parliament. Where the proportional distribution of seats is controlled, it 
affects the ability of Parliament to effectively use a confidence motion to oust a Government; this 
ability should not be limited by legislation. This paper also argues that limiting an MP' s ability to 
speak in dissent of their party operates as a breach of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act section 13 
and 14. And the sanction of party hopping amounts to a breach of section 17 of the Bill of Rights 
Act. 
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THE ELECTORAL (INTEGRITY) AMENDMENT BILL 1999: 
An Ineffective, Unnecessary and Undesirable Bill 
By Clare Heffernan 
I INTRODUCTION 
A Legislative History 
1 
In December 1999, the new Labour/Alliance Government introduced the 
Electoral (Integrity) Amendment Bill or as it is colloquially known - "the Party 
Hopping Legislation", (hereinafter cited as "the Bill"). The Bill has two stated 
purposes, the first , is to maintain the proportional distribution of seats within 
Parliament, as established on Election Day. The second is to enhance the integrity 
of Parliament. It is meant to achieve these purposes by requiring a Member of 
Parliament (MP) who defects from his or her party, to also vacate their seat in 
Parliament. 
The Bill had its first reading and was referred to the Justice and Electoral 
Committee on 22 December 1999. The Select Committee was divided equally in its 
recommendation - Labour and Alliance approved of the Bill, whereas Greens, 
National and Act fundamentally opposed the Bill - and the Bill returned to the 
House unamended. The Bill received a second reading on 9 November 2000 but 
debate was interrupted and no motion was passed. It was apparent to the 
Government that they did not have the numbers in the House to pass this Bill. By 
April 2001 , the Government was in negotiations with New Zealand First with a view 
to gaining its support for the Bill. Supplementary Order Paper number 177 (SOP) 
was drafted and introduced to Parliament by the Associate Justice Minister, Hon M 
Wilson, AG on 18 September 2001. In a press release the Government stated that, 
"The proposals have the support of the Government and New Zealand First". 
1 
Therefore, unless a Government or ew Zealand First member votes against party 
lines, it is expected that this Bill will be passed into law. 
1 New Zealand Government " Party Hopping to End" ( 18 September 200 I) Press Release 
y1ww.scoop.co.nz . 
2 
B Paper Outline 
This paper will critically analyse the Electoral (Integrity) Amendment Bill as 
amended by the SOP. under the assumption that the amendments will be passed in 
the House. 
In this paper I make three arguments. The first is that even with the SOP 
amendments, the Bill is not effective in meeting its twin purposes, the enhancement 
of public confidence in the integrity of the electoral system and the maintenance of 
the proportional distribution of seats within Parliament. 
My second argument is that even if such legislation were effective, it is 
simply unnecessary. This is so for two reasons, the first is that in the current 
environment there is no need for the legislation. Party hopping is symptomatic of 
the transition period from MMP to FFP, the second MMP Parliament is noticeably 
more stable than the first and there has been no party hopping since the last 
Parliament. The second argument is that the electoral system already has sufficient 
safeguards in place to limit unjustified party hopping. this is found primarily in the 
trienni1l election process. 
My third argument is that even if such legislation is effective, and is 
considered to be necessary, it is undesirable that such legislation be passed. The 
combined effect of the Bill and the SOP amendments is that party leaders who have 
the support of a two-third majority of their Caucus, have the power to expel a 
member from Caucus and therefore from Parliament. This raises a number of 
constitutional issues; the primary concern of this paper is the Bill ' s effect on the 
a?ility of Parliament to act as a constraint on executive power. The Bill 
substantially limits the principle of independence of MPs and therefore an MP's 
ability to vote according to their conscience. It also substantially weakens the threat 
posed by the ability of Parliament to remove a Government through a confidence 
motion. 
Before these arguments are made however, it is useful , first to consider the 
history of party hopping. which led the Government to introduce the Bill. 
3 
C Party Hopping 
Party Hopping is a term coined to describe the action of MPs who, during a 
parliamentary term, resign from their party and remain in Parliament. These MPs 
either switch to a new party, remain as an independent, or create a new party. 
Party hopping is not new and there have been instances of MPs leaving their 
parties in the past. However, party hopping to the extent seen, particularly since 
1993, is a new phenomenon and can be directly linked to the introduction of MMP. 
It is argued by political scientists that the party hopping, to the extent witnessed over 
the past few years is merely a symptom of a changing electoral system. It is argued 
that a certain amount of party hopping was necessary and to be expected, in order to 
create more parties. Once everything settles down, party hopping will be far less 
frequent. This was the reason for the "Sunset Clause" - clause 3 in the Bill.2 This 
clause states that the Bill will expire with the close of polling day for the second 
general election held after the date on which this Act comes into force. 
The '·recent" trend started in 1989, and those early party hoppers 
demonstrated this theory of transitional behaviour. Each of the early defections 
involved MPs with dynamic personalities, who actively spoke out against their 
parties. These MPs claimed to be disillusioned with their party ' s policy direction. 
Upon resignation from their party, each formed their own political party. Jim 
Anderton left Labour in 1989 and established ew Labour. The following year 
Gilbert Myles (MP for Roskill) and Hamish MacIntyre (MP for Manawatu) left 
National forming the Liberal Party. In October 1991 Winston Peters was dismissed 
from Cabinet, after which the National Party executive refused to re-select him as 
candidate for Tauranga. Peters left National and resigned from Parliament. He 
successfully contested his seat in the April 1993 By-election, and by July had 
announced the creation of a new party " ew Zealand First". 
After the 1993 referendum was decided in favour of introducing MMP, the 
number of electorates was reduced. The next spate of party hopping is perhaps a 
result of this. It is likely that there was also a certain amount of "strategic 
placement" in preparation for MMP. Those who previously had a "safe-seat" in a 
2 See part II B Proposed Amendments to the Electoral Act 1993. 
4 
particular electorate could no longer be so certain of their prospects of re-election. 
In September 1994, the Hobson electorate disappeared, and as a result Ross Meurant 
left National to form the Right-of-Centre Party. Not only did he not vacate his 
parliamentary seat, but he also remained in Cabinet.3
 Likewise after Trevor Rogers' 
electorate, Howick was incorporated into the redrawn Pakuranga. Rogers left 
National and also joined the Right-of-Centre party.
4 
Graeme Lee left his party after National refused to reappoint him as Minster 
of Internal Affairs after the 1993 election. ·'Disappointed at his treatment, Lee was 
another obvious source of discontent among members of National's Caucus, and 
observers of the political scene correctly judged that it was only a matter of time 
before he too struck out on his own ... he established the Christian Democrats Party 
in May 1995."5 
In Dunedin there were problems for Labour. "With three active, high-profile 
MPs ... representing the city, the down-sizing of Dunedin to two seats ... was always 
going to be painful for Labour. This was proved in late June 1995 when Dr Clive 
.• 
Matthewson, a former Labour Cabinet Minister, broke from the party he had 
represented in Parliament for 11 years to become leader of the United New Zealand 
group. He was accompanied by six other MPs - two from Labour (Margaret Austin 
and Peter Dunne, the latter having come via Future New Zealand), and four from 
National (Cabinet minister Bruce Cliffe, and backbenchers Pauline Gardiner, Peter 
Hilt and John Robertson)."6 
In March 1996 Michael Laws resigned from ational and joined New 
Zealand First. A month later Peter McCardle abandoned National and also moved to 
New Zealand First as did Labour MP, Jack Elder who was unhappy with his low 
placement on the Party list. 7 
This timeline provides useful information. The earlier party hoppers, Jim 
Anderton, Gilbert Myles, Hamish McIntyre and Winston Peters, were able to justify 
their actions by claiming that their party had moved away from its election mandate, 
3 Jonathan Boston, Stephen Levine. Elizabeth McLeay, and Nigel S Roberts, (ed) New Zealand 
Under MMP: A New Politics ? (Auckland University Press, Auckland, 1996) 50. 
4 Boston et al above n 3, 51. 
5 Boston et al above n 3, 51 . 
6 Boston et al above n 3, 52 . 
5 
and the public were able to judge for themselves whether their actions were 
justified. But as we moved closer towards the introduction of MMP, the reasons for 
resignation appear to be connected more to career advancement, and positioning 
oneself strategically for MMP. 
The first MMP election was in November 1996. Over half the country had 
voted for MMP, yet when the first election took place many were not prepared for 
the practical realities of the new system. For example, when Winston Peters sided 
with !-.Jational forming the National/New Zealand First Coalition, many New 
Zealanders were disillusioned; they had not expected Winston Peters to back 
National. The public felt cheated, and powerless. The power of the vote had been 
removed from their hands, and placed in the hands of the parties. "There [was] a 
feeling ... that Parliament [had] become a House of political parties rather than a 
House of Representatives."8 It was perceived that National became the Government 
as a matter of "luck" and '·party antics" as opposed to a legitimate mandate from the 
voting public. 
The first MP to defect under MMP Government was Alamein Kopu, who left 
the Alliance and remained in Parliament as an Independent. When the 
National/New Zealand First Coalition broke up, National was left to govern as a 
minority Government. Following Alamein Kopu, Neil Kirton resigned from New 
Zealand First citing protest over what he called Winston Peters ' "Litany of deceits 
and betrayals" .9 Next to resign from New Zealand First were five MPs who formed 
Mauri Pacific. National"s ability to remain a minority Government was due 
primarily to the support of those defecting MPs. Of significance is Alamein Kopu' s 
vote, which allowed National to pass legislation, cutting National Superannuation.
10 
Had these MPs remained with their parties, ational may not have been able to 
govern as a minority Government. 
These were not the type of antics. which the public had expected. While 
they had anticipated inter-party negotiation and consultation, they had not expected 
7 Boston et al above n 3, 55 . 
8 John Howard in Jonathan Hill " Election 1999: Voting in The Dark" (24 November 1999) Scoop 
Headlines www.scoop.co.nzJstories/H L99 I I /SOO 169.htm . 
9 Mich.1~1 Cullen ·'Defecting MPs" ( 17 December 1998) Press 
Releasewww.labour.org.nzJmediacentre I /speeches/981217 .html. 
10 Anthony Hubbard " Kopu 's 15 minutes over" (28 November 1999) Sunday Star Times Auckland 
A7 . 
6 
the loyalties of MPs to have such a significant impact on the Government of the 
day. Jenny Shipley (Prime Minister at the time) said, "People were told that MMP 
would give them better representation and more choice. I think it's given them 
clutter and confusion and to some extent disappointment''.
11 
The response of the public was reflected m the press of the day. 
Anthony Hubbard wrote: 12 
Voters hate party hoppers. We sent them into Parliament coloured red, or white and 
black, and once they got there they turned a treacherous blue. We detest [them] 
ultimately, these turncoat chameleons, and know them all by their first names; 
Alamein, Tuku, Tau, Rana, Tuariki . . . . the first chance we got, we turned them all out 
at a general election. 
The Sunday Star Times expressed the view that " . . . the frantic party hopping 
by defecting MPs of all kinds has naturally brought disillusionment with MMP as 
well. The system which was supposed to save us has let us down" .
13 
Kevin Taylor 
commented that public discontent with party hoppers and MMP as a system was at 
an all time high and cynicism about politics was more wide spread than ever. 
14 
The Sunday Star-Times wrote: 15 
Voters have been misled by the Left, the Right, and the Centre. Their faith in 
politicians is badly frayed . There are even signs, fortunatel y still faint , of a 
growing disillusionment with democracy itself. The task of the new parliament is 
to restore political confidence. It is an enormous job and the politicians, on their 
past record are likely to bungle it. But nothing in politics in the new millennium 
matters more . 
Labour and Alliance recognising the public' s disillusionment immediately 
pledged to prevent such practice in future Parliaments. Both parties promised to 
implement anti-party hopping legislation if they were elected in 1999. 
11 Kevin Taylor "NZ in the mood to prune; Party policies on : MMP and political accountability" (27 
October 1999) The Press Christchurch (available on-line at www.scoop.co.nz). 
12 Anthony Hubbard " Party Poopers" (5 December 1999) Sunday Star Times Auckland,C5. 
13 The Editor, " Important to restore confidence" (28 November I 999) Sunday Star Times Auckland, A 
10. 
14 Kevin Taylor above n 11 . 
15 The Editor above n 13 . 
7 
By 1999 the tide had turned against National and Labour and Alliance 
established a minority Coalition Government. The first Government Bill introduced, 
not surprisingly, was The Electoral (Integrity) Amendment Bill 1999. 
The reasons for the introduction of the Bill are couched in language of 
conct:m over the public ' s dissatisfied view of Parliament and the MMP system. 
However, I argue that the Bill also serves a third purpose, that of ensuring stability 
of Government, by giving party discipline the force of law through legislation and 
the threat of a confidence vote. When introducing the Bill at its first reading, Hon 
Wilson, AG said, "This Government has a responsibility to promote political 
stability and that is the primary purpose of this Bill".
16 
16 (22 December 1999) 581 NZPD 64. 
II IS THE ELECTORAL (INTEGRITY) AMENDMENT BILL 
EFFECTIVE? 
8 
This section of the paper serves three purposes. The first is to provide the 
reader with a summary of how defecting MPs are currently affected by the law. The 
second is to provide a summary of the proposed amendments to the Electoral Act 
and the third is to analyse the practical effects of the Bill. and determine whether the 
legislation is effective in meeting its policy objectives, according to the requirements 
of the Legislative Advisory Guidelines. 17 I conclude this section with the view that 
the Bill is ineffective in achieving its two purposes. 
A Current Law 
Section 55 of the Electoral Act 1993 currently stipulates the situations which 
will give rise to a vacancy within Parliament. The situations are all examples of 
where a member is rendered incapable of performing his or her function. Such as, 
where an MP fails to attend the House; or makes a declaration of allegiance to a 
foreign power; or is convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term of 
two years; or becomes a public servant; or resigns his or her seat; or dies or becomes 
mentally disordered. The focus of the section is the member's "personal" ability to 
perform his or her function as a representative. This section is designed to address 
personal incapacity, not the operation of Parliament or the maintenance of 
proportionality. The section does not include ceasing to be a member, or resignation 
from a political party. among the situations which will cause a vacant seat. 
Therefore MPs who cease to be members of their political party, whether through 
resignation or expulsion from that party. are free to remain in Parliament, either as 
Independents. or as members of another party. 
17 Ministry of Justice "Legislative Advisory Committee Guidelines on Process and Content of 
Legislation" (Wellington, 2000) <hnp://www.justice.e.ovt.nz/lac/pubs/200 I /leg,islative guide 
1 000/introduction.htm I (last accessed 22 September 220 I). 
9 
In anticipation of an MMP Parliament, and the likely changes to procedure, 
the Standing Orders were revised. Standing Order 34 expressly anticipates that MPs 
will change parties, and remain in Parliament. Standing Order 34 (2) states: 
Members who cease to be members of the party for which they were originally 
elected may be recognised as a party for parliamentary purposes if -
(a) They apply to the Speaker, and 
(b) Their new party is registered as a party by the Electoral 
Commission. 
Standing Order 34 (3) states: 
Any member who is not a member of a recognised party is treated as an 
Independent member for parliamentary purposes. 
The status of a member who remains in Parliament after leaving their party is 
determined by a number of factors. As an Independent. an MP's influence will 
depend on the current proportional distribution of parties within Parliament. If the 
Government of the day is a minority one and requires the lndependent's support, the 
Indep;·.ndent may have a significant influence over policy. If however, there is a 
majority Government, or majority Coalition Government, then their influence will 
be Jess. 
Participation in debate is determined by Standing Order I 03. Participation in 
debate is approximately proportional to party membership in the House. Priority is 
given to party spokespersons in order of the size of the party membership of the 
House. 18 
An Independent may not be represented on the Business Committee. 
Standing Order 74(2) states that "Every party with six or more members is entitled 
to be represented at each meeting of the Committee by one member nominated by its 
leader" and Standing Order 74(3) states that parties with fewer than six members 
whicb are in a Government coalition are entitled to choose one member between 
them to represent them on the Committee. Other parties with fewer than six 
18 Standing Order I 03; New Zealand Parliament, Standing Orders of the House of Representatives: 
brought into force 20 February 1996, amended 22 August 1996, amended 8 September 1999 (GP 
Print, Wellington, 1999). 
members and Independent members are entitled to choose one member between 
them to represent them on the Committee. 
10 
At the conclusion of the Parliamentary term, an MP's continued existence 
will be tested at the ballot box. Experience has shown that most party defectors do 
not survive re-election. 
" 
The current law acknowledges that MPs are able to act independently of their 
party, and will not be required to resign from their party if they disagree with its 
policy direction on a particular issue. Where a Bill adversely affects an MP' s 
electorate, he or she may vote contrary to party lines, or Caucus may determine a 
particular vote to be a "free vote" where all MPs are permitted to vote according to 
their conscience, independently of party lines. However, MPs as a general rule are 
expected to toe the party line. It would not be a wise career move, to constantly 
undermine the party position by voting independently. Consequences can include 
not being nominated for candidacy at the next election, the party may "isolate" or 
"freeze-out" the member or a party may expel a member from the party. 
For example the Labour Party Constitution includes the following disciplinary 
procedures: 19 
• Censure 
• Prohibition from seeking or holding any office 
• Prohibition from seeking or holding candidacy 
• Suspension of membership and expulsion from the Party. 
Such disciplinary action shall be applied for and ruled upon on the grounds of: 
(a) Contravention of the principles, rules and policies of the Party ... and/or 
(b) Bringing the Party into disrepute. 
20 
Such action is currently decided by the entire political party, which includes 
both the parliamentary political party and the extra-parliamentary party.
21 
19 Labour Party Constitution, cl 288 http://www.labour.org.nzJinfoCentre I/Organisation/ 
constitutionnovember 1997. 
20 Labc11r Party Constitution, cl 292 above n 19. 
21 The SOP amendments to the Bill indicate that this decision may now rest in the hands of the 
parliamentary political party. 
11 
B Proposed Amendments to the Electoral Act J 993 
Amendments to the Electoral Act have proceeded in two stages. The first 
was the Electoral (Integrity) Amendment Bill as originally submitted to Select 
Committee on 22 December 1999. Supplementary Order Paper number 177 has 
made further amendments to the Bill. For the purposes of this paper, discussion will 
usually refer to the combined effect of the amendments. Where a distinction is 
made between the two stages. it will be identified by reference to the "original Bill" 
or the SOP. 
The original Bill inserted a new section 55A into the Electoral Act. It provided 
that where a member voluntarily resigned from their party and provided notice of 
that resignation, in the prescribed form to the Speaker or in certain circumstances the 
Governor-General, they would be required to vacate their seat in Parliament. The 
Solicitor General 's vet stated that so long as the Bill only related to voluntary 
resignations, it would not be found to breach the Bill of Rights Act 1990.
22 
The original prov1s10n was strongly criticised as being ineffective and easily 
avoidable. The ACT, National and Green members of the committee concluded 
that:23 
This Bill contains essentially symbolic statements, without substantive 
enforceability. It applies to vacate the seat ofan MP only if the member, in effect, 
volunteers to go, by choosing to deliver a written notice of resignation from his or 
her party, to the Speaker or the Governor General. 
The Opposition also argued that the Bill could be avoided where an MP defects 
in substance but not in form:
24 
For example, a member who consistently votes against the positions of his or her 
party, or who does not attend Caucus, or who disrupts Caucus deliberations, or 
attends Caucus meetings of another party or is otherwise disloyal , could be 
unaffected. 
22 Solicitor-General "Electoral (Integrity) Amendment Bill 1999 - PCO 3426cl/2: compliance with 
New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990" EIA/J/2. 
23 House of Representatives Justice and Electoral Committee Report on the Electoral (Integrity) 
Amendment Bill No 3-1, 18 . 
The SOP seeks to resolve this procedural ineffectiveness by substituting 
section 55A with a new provision, and adding sections 55B, 55C, and 55D. 
12 
The new section 55A omits the words '·resigning from" and substitutes the 
words "ceases to be a parliamentary member of the political party for which the 
Member of Parliament was elected".25 The effect of section 55A is that it is no 
longer restricted to voluntary resignation, but now includes any other event, which 
terminates an MP's party membership. 
according to conscience. 
This arguably could include voting 
Under the new section 55A a member will cease to be a parliamentary member 
of their party when they deliver to the appropriate person, written notice, which 
complies with section 55B, this is similar to the original section 55A. The ability of 
an MP to easily avoid the section is addressed by section 55A(b), which makes a 
substantial change. Section 55A(b) states that a member also ceases to be a 
parliamentary member of their political party if the parliamentary leader of the 
political party delivers to the appropriate person, a written notice that complies with 
section 55C. 
Section 55C requires a notice signed by the parliamentary leader concerned, and 
addressed to the appropriate person. Section 55C(c) requires that the written notice 
be accompanied by a statement which complies with section 55D. Section 55D 
states: 
24 House of Representatives Justice and Electoral Committee above n 23, 18. 
25 Supplementary Order Paper 177, proposed section SSA, emphasis added. 
550 Form of statement to be made by parliamentary leader 
The statement referred to in section 55C(c) must be in writing and signed by the 
parliamentary leader concerned, and must -
(a) state that the parliamentary leader reasonably believes that the member of 
Parliament concerned has acted in a way that has distorted, and is likely 
to continue to distort, the proportionality of political party representation in 
Parliament as determined at the last general election; and 
(b) state that the parliamentary leader has delivered to the member of Parliament 
concerned written notice -
(i) informing the member that the parliamentary leader considers that paragraph 
(a) applies to the member and the reasons for that opinion ; and 
(ii) advising the member that he or she has 21 working days from the date of 
receiving the notice to respond to the matters raised in the notice by notice in 
writing addressed to the parliamentary leader; and 
(c) state that, after consideration of the conduct of the member and his or her response 
(if any) by the parliamentary members of the political party for which the member 
was elected, the parliamentary leader of that party confirms that at least two-thirds 
of the parliamentary members of the party agree that written notice should be 
given by the parliamentary leader under section 55A(3)(b). 
13 
The two main issues raised by this provision are found in 55D(a) and 55D(c). 
Under 55D(a) the italicised passage above is particularly problematic, the wording is 
vague and it is unclear what conduct will be considered to distort the proportional 
distribution of seats within Parliament. The provision has the potential to cover any 
., 
manner of conduct. It is my view that the wording is broad enough to include MPs 
choosing to vote according to conscience rather than party lines.
26 
Section 55D(c) is problematic because it gives party leaders and the Caucus 
much more power than they currently hold. Currently, Caucus is able to expel a 
member from Caucus and ultimately Parliament. Traditionally it is the entire 
political party which determines membership, and the voter who determines who is 
a member of the House of Representatives. 
26 See part IV B 3 Effect of the Electoral (Integrity) Amendment Bill on the operation of the Principle 
of Independence of Members of Parliament. 
14 
C Will the Bill be Effective in Achieving its Purposes? 
1. Will the Bill enhance public confidence in the integrity of the 
electoral system? 
Following the 1996-1999 Parliament, there was a definite perception of 
public dissatisfaction with MMP.27 If it is established that there is a link between the 
public ' s view of politicians and their view of MMP; then it is likely that this Bill, if 
effective, would enhance public confidence in the integrity of the electoral system. It 
is useful to consider the 2001 survey submitted to the MMP Review Select 
Committee, which outlines a comprehensive study of the perceptions of, and 
attitudes towards MMP amongst New Zealanders.28 This report confirms that there 
is a connection between the conduct of MPs and the public ' s satisfaction with the 
MMP system as a whole. The report found that public"s judgements ofMMP are:
29 
... Intertwined with the level of general satisfaction with politics and 
politicians. Debate does not proceed on a rational academic basis . .. 
Perceptions hinge much more on general judgments of politics and 
politicians, with the electoral system being blamed accordingly". 
The report stated, "It is clear that the hopes and expectations of many MMP 
supporters took a big hit during the political turmoil of the 1996 to 1999 period".
30 
The report found that 52 per cent of those surveyed believed that MMP has proved 
to be a disappointment. 31 The report further stated that "MMP is now clearly in the 
position where it is taking some of the blame for perceived poor performance of 
politicians and political parties" .32 
When participants were asked what changes they would make to MMP a 
prominent, although not the most frequent response was ·· ... changing the method of 
election of list MPs and ending party hopping''.
33 
27 See Part I B Party Hopping. 
28 UMR Insight Limited "MMP: A Study of Public Attitudes [Executive Summary]" (submission to 
MMP Review Select Committee, UMR Insights Limited, Wellington, February 2001) 
http :/ !www .c I erk. par I ia ment. govt. nz/pub I ications/ index. htm I 
29 UMR Insight Limited above n 28. 5. 
30 UMR Insight Limited above n 28, 13 . 
3 1 UMR Insight Limited above n 28, 6. 
32 UMR Insight Limited above n 28, 13 . 
33 UMR Insight Limited above n 28, 15 . 
In summary therefore: 34 
There was overall strong support in the qualitative research for banning 
party hopping, declaring Coalition partners prior to election and setting 
a limited timeframe for Coalition negotiations. There was little serious 
dissent against any of these propositions. Some saw them as almost too 
obvious to merit discussion. Support for the banning of party hopping 
remained solid despite prompted counter arguments of MPs being 
placed in a difficult position if parties change philosophies or policies. 
There was also only very slight support for applying any ban on party 
hopping to list MPs alone. 
15 
Thus as of February 2001 , there was clearly a public dissatisfaction with 
party hopping and this could be linked to the public ' s view of MMP. However, for 
this Bill to be effective in increasing the integrity of Parliament, the conduct of MPs 
must be the sole reason for the public's dissatisfaction in the electoral system. 
Where it is but one factor, this Bill will not achieve this purpose, unless it addresses 
all concerns. 
The report identified a number of other factors , which contributed to public 
dissatisfaction. There was disappointment that MMP had not been more effective at 
tempering the perceived adversarial nature of New Zealand politics. "Some 
supporters of MMP in 1993 clearly had somewhat utopian expectations that under 
MMP New Zealand would be governed by some form of all party Coalition."
35 
There was also "general disquiet" about list MPs. There was considerable 
general suspicion apparent about the accountability and workload of list MPs. 
Respondents during the qualitative research often described list MPs as "unelected". 
One key criticism was that it was possible for MPs to be defeated in electorate 
contests but return to the House through their position on the 1 ist, " .... 61 % agreed 
and 15% disagreed that list MPs are not as accountable to voters as electorate 
MPs".36 
Others criticised MMP because of its "perceived impact on Government 
decision-making. Some see the need to consult and the involvement of more parties 
34 UMR Insight Limited above n 28, 15. 
35 UMR Insight Limited above n 28, 6. 
36 UMR Insight Limited above n 28, 13 . 
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in decision-making as ruling out any possibility of a Government making hard 
decisions. There was similar concern that MMP meant that making decisions takes 
too long."37 
Thus, it appears that public dissatisfaction in the electoral system can be 
linked to a wide range of factors. While the Bill may stem public disquiet regarding 
party hopping, it is inconclusive whether this piece of legislation alone would 
"enhance public confidence in the integrity of the electoral system". 
2. Will the Bill maintain proportionality? 
In situations where either section 55 or 55A of the Electoral Act are invoked, 
whether or not proportionality is maintained depends on whether it is a list MP or 
electorate MP who must vacate his or her seat. 
The starting assumption is that if a list MP vacates his or her seat, the next 
candidate on the list will replace them and proportionality will normally be 
maintained. If an electorate MP vacates his or her seat, then it will depend on the 
outcome of the By-election whether or not proportionality as established by the 
previous election is maintained. 
The MMP system does not guarantee that proportionality will be maintained 
for the entire term. If this was desired, a provision such as found in the German 
system that all vacancies be filled by a list MP would have been included. The 
current Electoral Act makes no such provision. 
A number of occurrences will affect the proportionality of Parliament 
following an election; party hopping is only one of those occurrences. A 
parliamentary party may cease to exist as a totally separate party following a 
complete merger with another party or by becoming a component party. A political 
party may dissolve altogether, leaving all its MPs free to become Independents, to 
join other parliamentary parties,38 or to form new parties. A parliamentary party 
may split into two or more new parties, MPs belonging to an umbrella party may 
37 UMR Insight Limited above n 28 , 13. 
38 The SOP amendments may cover this situation if the original party continues to exist and chooses 
to invoke sanctions. 
decide to become MPs representing their respective component parties, or an MP 
39 
may b,;;: expelled from a party. 
17 
Circumstances may necessitate that additional provisions of the Electoral Act 
are invoked; Sections 131, 136 and 13 7 are particularly relevant. Section 131 and 
136 of the Electoral Act 1993 provide that a majority of seventy-five percent of all 
MPs may resolve not to fill a vacancy in an electorate seat'
0 
or a list seat'
1 
if the 
vacancy occurs within six months of the expiry of Parliament or if the Prime 
Minister advises the House that a General Election will be held within six months. 
The seat then remains vacant until the General Election and in general the 
proportional distribution of seats would be disturbed during that period. The House 
passed resolutions under section 131 in May 1996 and 1999.
42 
Section 137 of the Electoral Act 1993 provides that a vacancy in a list seat is 
not to be filled if there is no candidate on the party's list who is lower in order of 
preference than the former list MP and who remains a member of the party and is 
willing to replace the former list MP. In those circumstances, the list seat remains 
unfilled until the next general election. thus changing the proportionality of the seats 
in Parliament during that period.
43 
A vacant list seat may also have to remain unfilled if the political party to 
which a former list MP belonged no longer exists as a separate organisation. There 
would then be no person who is the Secretary of the party to respond to the Chief 
Electoral Officer's enquiry under section 137(3) of the Act about a list candidate' s 
continuing membership of the party.
44 
39 The Electoral Commission "Submission to the Justice and Electoral Select Committee on the 
Electoral (Integrity) Amendment Bill" para 2.4 . 
40 Electoral Act 1993 s 131. 
41 Electoral Act 1993 s 136. 
42 The Electoral Commission "Submission to the Justice and Electoral Select Committee on the 
Electoral (Integrity) Amendment Bill'" paras 2 . 1 and 2 .3. 
43 The Electoral Commission above n 42, para 2. 1 (b) . 
44 The Electoral Commission above n 42, para 2.1 (c) . 
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I have demonstrated that the proposed amendments to the Electoral Act do 
not cover or anticipate all the circumstances where changes to the proportional 
distribution of seats may occur. Furthermore, proportionality is only guaranteed 
when it is a list MP who resigns their seat. Therefore, the amendments proposed in 
the Electoral Integrity Bill will not maintain proportionality in every situation where 
proportionality is affected. 
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III IS THIS BILL NECESSARY? 
According to the Legislative Advisory Committee (LAC) Guidelines, one of 
the first questions to ask when considering creating new legislation is. whether 
legislation is needed to give effect to the policy which the Government is planning 
to implement" .45 Or in other words, is legislation necessary? In considering this 
question, officials are expected to consider a range of alternatives to legislation 
whict may also achieve the policy goals. Among the list of alternative 
considerations is "the status quo" which includes the potential for a problem to self 
correct, and "existing law" which would in this case, include existing restraints on 
party hopping behaviour. 
It is my argument that party hopping legislation is not necessary, this is 
supported by two key arguments. The first is the "transition phase argument", that 
is, that the problem is due merely to the transition from FPP to MMP, and as the 
system settles down, so too will party hopping. The second argument is that 
triennial elections provide a sufficient control over party hopping. Therefore the 
problem of party hopping has the potential to self-correct and existing law operates 
as a reasonable restraint on party hopping. 
A The "Transition Phase" Argument 
The introduction of a new electoral system inevitably involves a temporary 
reduction in stability. Parties, candidates, and voters have to learn new strategies 
while passing through a period of enhanced surprise, di sappointment. and 
frustration . 46 
But, this is only temporary. Already under the second MMP Parliament, 
things have visibly settled down. Politicians and the public alike seem to be coming 
to terms with the new system. It is also significant that so far, there has been no 
party hopping under the second MMP Government.
47 
45 Ministry of Justice " Legislative Advisory Committee Guidelines on Process and Content of 
Legislation·• (Wellington, 2000) 
<http://www.justice .govt .n1J1ac/pubsl200 I /legi slati ve guide 2000 /introduction .html (last accessed 
22 Sepember 220 I) emphasi s added. 
46 Rein Taagepera and Matthew S Shugart in Jonathan Boston, Stephen Levine, Elizabeth McLeay, 
and Nigel S Roberts (ed) New Zealand Under MMP: A New Politics? (Auckland University Press, 
Auckland, 1996) 15. 
47 As of I October 200 I . 
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Alan McRobbie and Professor Keith Jackson presented a detailed and 
informative submission to the Justice and Law Reform Select Committee. Their 
submission made a comparison with the German experience under AMS (which is 
most analogous to MMP). Party hopping was common during the initial phases of 
transition to AMS and lessened in later years. 
In the first post-war Bundestag (1949-53) 53 of the 4020 MPs (13.2 per cent) left 
their parties. This is recognised as a transitional period from the old (Weimar 
republic) regime to the new, democratic parliamentary system resulting from the 
introduction of the additional member electoral system. The second Bundestag 
(1953-57) saw 40 defection (8 .2 per cent of MPs) , and the third (1957-61), 21 
( 4 .2 per cent). Since then, with the sole exception of the 1967-72 Bundestag, 
defections from German parties have been consistently below I per cent of the 
Bundestag' s total membership.
48 
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It is also of interest that in Germany, Article 38(1) of Germany's Basic Law 
states that members of the Bundestag · ... shall be representatives of the whole 
people; they shall not be bound by any instructions, only by their conscience ' .
49 In 
other words, German MPs have an express right to act independently of their parties, 
and still, party hopping has remained low for three decades. 
48 
Alan McRobie and Keith Jackson "Submission to the Justice and Electoral Select Committee on 
the electoral (Integrity) Amendment Bill", number 8, para 7. 
49 
Alan McRobie and Keith Jackson above n 48, para 7. 
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While this is a valid argument, the fact that the high number of defections 
only occurred in the first election and have not occurred at all in the second points t
o 
the common- sense conclusion that the situation has resolved itself, therefor
e 
legislation to the same effect is superfluous and unnecessary. 
B Triennial Elections 
Party hopping is self-correcting on a second level. It is apparent that the 
public views party hoppers with distaste, and these views were evidenced by vote
r 
conduct at the 1999 elections, of the seven members who defected between 199
6 
and 1999, not one was re-elected for a subsequent term. This demonstrates that th
e 
public is perfectly able to form an opinion regarding the conduct of a particular MP
. 
It is interesting to note however, that Jim Anderton. Winston Peters, and Peter 
Dunne, remained in Parliament following their defections prior to the 1996 election
. 
Perhaps this is further evidence that the public will be the judge of whether 
a 
resignation is justified or not. Or perhaps more likely, it is evidence that post FPP
, 
the pt1hlic is less likely to tolerate party hopping. 
The public's vote will act as a significant control over party hopping in the 
future. MPs have seen the public response to party hoppers and are fully aware o
f 
the likely consequences to their parliamentary careers if they choose to defect from
 
their parties. This view was expressed in the Sunday-Star Times: 
51 
It should now be obvious to opportunist party hoppers that the public 
dislikes them and will punish them, after all, is just another face of the 
same issue, of democratic trust. Those who are elected into parliament 
carrying one banner and then switch to another can expect no more. We 
have all had enough of political turncoats and political treachery. The MPs 
in parliament must know that they lie and mislead at their peril, and that 
lying [impedes] more than just their own petty ambitions. 
An MP contemplating resignation from their party would therefore have to 
have some strong reasons to justify their actions in the eyes of the voting public
. 
This will prevent the type of party hopping seen prior to the first MMP election
, 
50Ministry of Justice "Electoral (Integrity) Amendment Bill Report of the Ministry of Ju
stice" EIA 
J/3, 5. 
51 The Editor "Important to restore confidence" (28 November 1999) The Sunday Star-T
imes 
Auckland, A I 0. 
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where MPS strategically placed themselves for the next election, influenced by 
changing electorate boundaries and party lists. 
The Ministry of Justice, m making comment on the Bill on behalf of the 
Government stated:
52 
. .. defections are motivated by a number of factors . The legislation does 
not distinguish between different types of defections. However, it would 
be very difficult to legally make a distinction between different types of 
defections. 
While it is difficult to make a distinction between different types of 
defections through legislation, the voting public is perfectly capable of making that 
distinction. The Ministry of Justice went on to discuss the role of voters, and 
acknowledged that they would be able to support or reject the MP' s motivations.
53 
It is my argument that if it is recognised that the public is capable of sanctioning the 
actions of MPs, then it is unnecessary to provide sanctions through legislation. The 
triennial elections have long been the prime mechanism by which an MP 's actions 
are judged. It is the voters who place MPs in Parliament, and is ultimately the voters 
who should remove them from Parliament. The effect of the Bill is that now the 
decision to remove members from Parliament is in the hands of party leaders and the 
Caucus. The triennial election has proved an adequate safeguard in the past; there is 
no reason to suppose that it would not still be adequate to prevent party hopping. 
The opposing argument to this theory is that ' ' it is important to restore public 
confidence and party proportionality at the time of the defection, rather than waiting 
up to three years until the next election" . 
54 The flaw in this argument is that it will 
create a disparity between list MPs and electorate MPs, this was acknowledged to be 
undesirable. both by the Ministry of Justice and the Electoral Law Reform 
Commission.55 If the decision to punish an MP is left until the next election, then 
neither list MPs or electorate MPs are treated any differently, both campaign for re-
election on an equal footing. But, if the decision is made during the parliamentary 
term, there will be a difference in treatment between a list MP and an electorate MP. 
52 Ministry of Justice above n 50, 5. 
53 See Ministry of Justice above n 50, 5. 
54 Ministry of Justice above n 50, 6. 
55 
Ministry of Justice above n 50, 6 and Report of the Royal Commission on the Electoral syste
m, 
Towards a Beller Democracy, (GP Print, Wellington, 1986). 
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Where a list seat is vacated, the next candidate on the list will fill the seat. 
The defecting MP will have to wait up to three years before they can test voter 
confidence in their decision. An electorate MP however. will have the opportunity 
to test voter confidence immediately, because an electorate seat is usually subject to 
a by-election. The one exception is section 131 of the Electoral Act 1993. 
56 
Where 
the vacancy arises within six months of the expiry of Parliament. a 75 per cent 
majority of the House may elect that a seat remain vacant. Therefore, in most 
instances, where the decision is made at the time of defection, as opposed to at the 
next election, an electorate MP has a distinct advantage over a list MP. There is no 
way to prevent this disparity of treatment in the legislation, wherever a member is 
required to vacate their seat, a list MP will always be disadvantaged. It is not only 
the list MP who is disadvantaged, but also the public. The public does not have the 
ability to express their approval or condemnation of that MP"s action. The survey 
submitted to the MP Review Committee indicated that lack of accountability of MPs 
was a reason for disenchantment with the system, a Bill that denies the voter the 
right to judge an MP's action, is likely to aggravate discontentment with the system 
rather than resolve it. 
lt is therefore apparent that the fairest, and most constitutional means of 
limiting party hopping is through 011hodox means. The triennial election is a 
perfectly adequate means of limiting party hopping; it is also the only means by 
which equal treatment of both list MPs and electorate MPs can be maintained. 
It is also true that there has been no party hopping ince 1999. One would 
think that the presence of party hopping legi lation on the Government agenda since 
1999 would encourage rather than deter party hopping. Anyone contemplating 
leaving their party would be aware that it i better to do so now, before the Bill is 
pas ed, rather than later, when their actions would be subject to legislation. The fact 
that there have been no defection during the current Government indicates that 
while such legi lation may have been perceived as necessary in 1999 it i no longer 
nece ary in 200 I. The common-sense conclusion is that there i simply no longer 
any need for party hopping legislation. The problem has self-corrected. 
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IV AN UNDESIRABLE BILL 
My third argument is that this Bill substantially limits the ability of 
Parliament to act as a check on the power of the executive, and is therefore 
constitutionally undesirable. The Bill has the potential to sanction MPs who speak 
out against, or vote contrary to their party. This will increase party discipline, 
giving it the force of law, at the expense of the principle of independence of MPs. 
The penalty for independent action is the requirement that the MP vacate his or her 
Parliamentary seat, this will operate as a chilling effect because MPs are unlikely to 
vote according to their conscience when the penalty is so grave. This Bill will also 
prevent party hopping. But, in doing so it will reduce the threat of the Government 
losing a confidence vote. It is my argument that the threat of the confidence vote is 
vital to ensuring consultative and accountable Government. 
A An Unpredictable Political System 
The move from FPP to MMP has introduced a system, which was intended 
to restrict the dominance of the Executive over Parliament. Under MMP, 
Government is unlikely, although it is still possible, to be a single-party majority. 
Four types of Government are possible, the single-party majority, the single-party 
minority, the colation majority and the coalition minority. All but the single-party 
majority require some form of consensus between parties in order to pass legislation. 
Where Government is a minority or coalition the Executive will have to consult and 
negotiate with other parties to ensure their support. This was intended to limit 
excessive executive power but it has also introduced some unpredictability into our 
electoral system. 
It is a mistake to assume that "unpredictability" is a negative concept. 
Under FPP, Government was predictable in the sense that a single party established 
policy, and the opposition party could do very little to influence a change in that 
policy. Under MMP the passage of legislation according to the policy direction of 
one party is not guaranteed, because, where Governments rely on the support of 
other parties, it must negotiate policy that is acceptable to those parties. 
56 See part II D Will the Bill maintain proportionality? 
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It is also a mistake to assume that predictability leads to stability. While 
FPP Governments were usually stable during their tenure in office, often a change of 
Government would lead to instability. Under FPP, where an election brought a 
change from Labour to National, or vice-versa, the effect on policy was usually an 
abrupt about-turn. Labour and National often represented two polar views, and 
policy represented a left or right viewpoint. Abrupt policy changes also cause 
instability. The advantage of MMP and consultative government is that policy is 
more likely to take a middle ground approach, incorporating a wider range of 
interests. While the negotiating process may be unpredictable, it is likely that the 
policy formed will be more stable and enduring. 
Party hopping has also created a degree of unpredictability, both for the voter 
and the parliamentary parties themselves. Under FPP, the Government elected on 
election night, was unlikely to change mid-parliamentary term. However, with 
MMP, as we have seen, party hopping and changes in the proportional distribution 
of seat can lead to unforseen re ults. For example, after the collapse of the 
National/New Zealand First Coalition during the first MMP Parliament, National 
went from a majority coalition to a minority Government, propped up only by MPs 
who had defected from other parties. Quite the opposite could have occurred, for 
without the upport of defecting MPs, National would have lo t the confidence of 
the House, and therefore would not have been able to govern. 
Under FPP constraints on the executive were very rarely invoked. "The last 
time a confidence vote wa lo t in New Zealand wa 1928".
57 
Under MMP, it 
appear that the likelihood of changes in proportionality, causing a government to 
lose the confidence of the I louse is a very real threat. It is this threat. which will 
create better government, increa ing the power of Parliament over the Executive, 
and insuring greater intra- and inter-party con ultation. 
Thu , this Bill eeks to limit the ability of Parliament to act as a constraint on 
xecutive power and i therefore constitutionally and democratically undesirable. 
The remainder of this paper will di cuss the two primary ways in which Parliament 
is able to act as a constraint on Executive power. That is, through the principle of 
57 Profcs or Matthew .R Palmer "Mini terial Re pon ibility versu Chief Executive Accountability" 
connict or complement?" (In titute for International Research conference on "analysing and 
Under tanding rucial Development in PUBLI LAW" (Wellington, 4 April 2001) 3. 
independence of MPs and the exercise of the confidence vote. It is interesting to 
note the comments made by the authors of Bridled Power:
58 
MMP does not mean the government will be impossible or will not take 
place .. . the basic structures and processes of Westminster government originally 
evolved in an era, before the dominance of the two-party system, which was more 
similar to relationships under MMP than FPP. Traditional mechanisms such as 
the vote of confidence ... and the power of Parliament make more sense in a multi-
party than in a two-party system. 
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It will be seen that the current system revitalises these concepts, under FPP, 
they were unlikely to have any substantial effect, and the main constraint of the 
executive was the triennial election. Under MMP these traditional constraints are 
likely to operate as a check on executive power. It will be seen that the current 
system has internal mechanisms by which it limits the application of both of these 
principles in a justified manner. It is my argument that the Bill would operate as an 
unjustified limit on the operation of these principles. 
B The Independence of Members of Parliament as a Constraint on Executive 
Power 
I . Origins of the principle of the Independence of Members of 
Parliament 
New Zealand adopted the Westminster system of Government, and in so 
doing, retained the principle of Independence of Members of Parliament. In the 
early days of the Westminster system. MPs were elected as independent 
representatives of their local constituency, and political parties did not exist in an 
overt extra-parliamentary form. Therefore. as independent representatives, 
parliamentarians were justified in expressing independent views, and this was seen 
as a means of restricting the power of the State.
59 According to what became known 
as the " liberal constitutional model", the main function of Parliament was to act as a 
deliberative assembly. It was a meeting place; where elected representatives could 
58 Geoffrey Palmer and Matthew Palmer Bridled Power: New Zealand Government Under MMP (3 
ed , Auckland University Press , Auckland, 1997) 16. 
59 See generally Richard Mulgan Politics in New Zealand (2 ed, Auckland University Press, 
Auckland, 1997). 
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critichlly debate the issues of the day, each contributing his
60 own individual 
opinions and judgments to the process. And the government of the day had no right 
to expect that its proposals would as a matter of course receive the endorsement of 
the assembly. 6
1 
With the advent of the political party, the principle of independence became 
somewhat more strained. Under the FPP system, candidates still ran as candidates 
for a particular constituency, but were almost always a member of either the 
National or Labour Political Party. The party that won the most seats become the 
next government. Accordingly, the political reality was that when casting a vote for 
an electorate candidate, voters were deciding between two parties. 
Thus, an MP's loyalties became divided, between duties owed to their party, 
and t1J their local constituency. As a representative of the party under which they 
were elected, MPs owed an obligation to support the party in implementing its 
electoral mandate; this duty was even greater if their party was the governing party. 
This duty extended to the voting public who had a legitimate expectation that its 
elected representative would act in support of the party. As a representative of a 
local constituency, the MP owed duties to that constituency, which could potentially 
be different from, and/or conflict with the duties owed to his or her political party. 
The constituency had a legitimate expectation that the Member would operate in a 
manner, which promoted the needs of that constituency. An MP also retained the 
right to act according to his or her conscience, which again may conflict with duties 
owed to his or her party. 
In recognition of these often-divided loyalties, a set of non-binding internal 
party mles developed within, and outside of Parliament to accommodate an MP's 
different obligations. These still remain today. The status quo is that once Caucus
62 
had made a decision, its members were bound to stand by it. The principle of 
independence of MPs was recognised in two exceptions to the rule. The first is the 
"free vote", that is, the right to vote according to conscience, free from the 
obligation to keep to a party line. The decision to allow a free vote is a collective 
decision made by the caucus as a whole to relax the rules of collective solidarity in 
60 There were no female members of Parliament until late in the twentieth century. 
61 Mulgan above n 59, 106-107. 
62 The Parliamentary members of a Political Party. 
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particular cases. The second exception is that the Caucus may allow an individual 
member to go against party policy where the member feels a need to support th
e 
local interests of his or her constituents.
63 
It was recognised that the ability of MPs to vote according to conscience 
could be counter-intuitive to operational Government. It is therefore count
er 
balanced by party discipline. Party discipline ensures that MPs vote according 
to 
party policy and party lines. Where party discipline is strong, party leaders can 
be 
assured that members will support party policy and vote accordingly. 
Traditionally under a plurality system, party discipline has been strong. It 
was primarily maintained because of "the comparatively small size of the Ne
w 
Zealand Parliament in international terms and because the Cabinet dominate
d 
Caucus through seniority, experience, and numbers."
64 With the advent of MMP, the 
increase in the number of MPs may make the governing caucus less easi
ly 
dominated by the executive, " [t]his may encourage a loosening of party disciplin
e 
and hence make the executive less assured of voting support in the House".
65 An MP 
may find it easier to depart from party lines, with the knowledge that they can joi
n 
another party or remain in Parliament as an Independent Member. 
Party discipline is maintained through informal mechanisms, such as peer 
pressure and coercion of argument from the parliamentary political party. It is als
o 
maintained through the influence of the extra-parliamentary party. A party ca
n 
refuse to re-select an MP for candidacy for the next election, or place them on 
a 
lower ranking on the party list. However. we have seen that such threats ma
y 
actually motivate MPs to resign from their party. There, is therefore, a potentia
l 
danger that party hopping may unduly influence parliamentary parties in the proces
s 
of candidate selection. This may be contrary to section 71 of the Electoral A
ct 
1993.66 The political reality may very well be that where an MP holds the balanc
e 
63 Richard Mulgan above n 59, 113. 
1,.1 Geoffrey Palmer and Matthew Palmer Bridled Power: New Zealand government u
nder MMP (3'd 
ed, Oxford University Press. Auckland.1997) 7. 
65 Harris, Paul ·'The Electoral System" in Holland, Martin(ed) Electoral Behaviour in N
ew Zealand 
(Oxford University Press, Auckland, 1992) I, 9. 
66 Section 71 Requirement for registered parties to follow democratic procedur
es in candidate 
selection 
Every political party that is for the time being registered under this Part of the A
ct shall ensure that 
provision is made for participation in the selection of candidates representing th
e party for election as 
members of Parliament .. . 
of power, in his or her vote, that MP may be able to use that position to influence 
his or her ranking on a party list, or to ensure re-selection as a candidate. 
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I have used the term '·counter balance" to describe the role of party 
discipline. This is because both independence of MPs and internal party discipline 
are important. Richard Mulgan stated:
67 
If the voters in electing a Parliament have been helping to choose a party 
government, they can expect Parliament to sustain the party government and to let 
it govern effectively. At the same time, the government must be subject to 
constant public scrutiny to prevent it from abusing its power and to keep it 
accountable and responsive to the public . . . Parliament thus has two broad 
purposes, which may sometimes be in conflict, to facilitate the people ' s 
government and to scrutinise it. 
The principle of independence of MPs acts as a check on executive power 
and party discipline acts as " ... a guarantee of the voter's choice. The party label 
gives the voter a say in the choice of government and policies. Party discipline is 
necessary to see that the party delivers its commitments" .
68 
With the advent of MMP, there has been debate as to whether the principle 
of independence has been retained, especially with regard to the List MP, who 
doesn' t have a local constituency and arguably ''has no other being ... than as a 
creature of his or her party".69 I acknowledge that, "The change to MMP underlines 
the centrality of political parties to Parliament by giving voters a specific party vote 
which determines the party composition of Parliament".
70 However, the 
acknowledgement of political parties. does not, in itself abolish the ability of MPs to 
act independently, the principle has survived alongside the operation of party 
politics, for most ofNew Zealand's political history. 
It is my view that the principle of independence still operates under MMP as it 
did under FPP, but its effect may be more significant. With the move from FPP to 
MMP, "many of the elements of the previous constitution remain intact, for 
instance, the executive power of Cabinet, the legal supremacy of Parliament and the 
67 Richard Mulgan Politics in New Zealand (2"d ed), Auckland University Press, Auckland, I 997,110. 
68 Richard Mulgan above n 67, 68. 
69 (9 November 2000) 588 NZPD 6493 . 
70 Richard Mulgan above n 67, I 09. 
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absence of an upper house". 71 There is nothing to suggest that the principle of 
Indep':'ndence of MPs has not also been retained, especially when one considers that 
the purpose of MMP was to increase Parliamentary control over the executive. If 
Parliament is still to be supreme, then limits on the ability of Parliament to function 
as a constraint on the executive are prima facie undesirable. 
The primary evidence that suggests that the principle has been retained is the 
retention of the "electorate vote". 72 Under FPP, the vote for a local representative 
was essentially a fiction, the reality for most voters was that they were voting for the 
party they wished to see in Government, as opposed to the person best able to 
represent the constituency's interests. It is arguable that the retention of the 
electorate vote, in light of the express party vote, further enhances the notion of 
independence. The first MMP election was evidence, of the value placed on 
individual representation: 73 
The overall extent of split-ticket voting in New Zealand's first MP election was very 
high by international standards . . . New Zealanders clearly relished the opportunity 
given by the mixed member proportional electoral system to distinguish between two 
very different propositions formerly concealed when voting under first-past-the-post 
(FPP). For the first time in New Zealand ' s history, it was possible for electors to 
vote for a local MP without in any way compromising their views about the party 
best fitted to govern the country. 
It was also made clear by the Ministry of Justice when reporting on behalf of 
the National Government on Cullen's 1997 Party Hopping Bill that the principle of 
independence of MPs still exists under MMP. The Department stated: 74 
MPs were not mere mouthpieces of their parties, rather they are independent 
agents who answer to their own consciences and to the people, not just their 
party ... lt has always been the case [that] the Members of the Parliament are 
legally entitled to act independently in the House. 
71 Mulgan above n 67, 65. 
72 Ministry of Justice "Submission to the Justice and Law Reform Committee on the Electoral (Party 
Registration) Bill 1997 no 65-1 ". 
73 Stephen Levine and Nigel S Roberts "Surveying the Snark: Voting Behaviour in the 1996 New 
Zealand General Election" in Boston et al From Campaign to Coalition (The Dunmore Press, 
Palmerston North , 1997) 183, 186. 
74 Hubbard, Anthony " Party poopers" (5 December 1999) The Sunday Star-Times Auckland, CS. 
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This statement, applies equally to the list MP. The list MP is said to have 
a national constituency. On behalf of the Government, in response to submissions 
on the Bill the Ministry of Justice said. "it can be argued ... that list MPs have a 
national constituency in the same way that constituency MPs have a local 
constituency, and that they have an (albeit less direct) popular mandate from voters 
nation-wide". 75 This is because all voters, when casting votes for a party have the 
opportunity to see the content of the party list. A list MP, like an electorate MP can 
also be said to have divided loyalties. Parties attempt to ensure that their lists are 
diverse, and often the reason for an MP's placement comes down to a particular 
class of persons that they represent. For example, Pansy Wong, who was New 
Zealand's first Asian MP. 
The List allows minority voices and persons who may not normally receive 
the support of the electorate, to have a voice in Parliament. They were placed on the 
Party List as a means of attracting party votes, as indicative of the representative 
nature of the particular party. Thus, the mandate for their position is also as a 
representative of the "class'· of persons they were intended to attract. 
The threat oflosing one's seat in Parliament due to expulsion from a political 
party may act as a further restraint on a list MP's ability to speak up for the minority 
group they represent. It should also be noted that many members who enter 
Parliament on a list, are less politically ·savvy',
76 they do not necessarily know the 
'rules of the game·, and are usually a minority within Parliament. This in itself will 
often act as a restraint on their ability to speak freely. MMP was introduced with the 
intention that a greater proportion of New Zealanders would be represented within 
Parliament. It is vital that no unjustifiable restraints are placed on those persons who 
will have diverse viewpoints and knowledge to offer. 
Thus it can be seen that both types of MPs owe loyalties to more than just 
their parties. They are both equally representative of the people, regardless of how 
they came to be in Parliament. Therefore, a list MP should be able to express 
independent views within the House, to the same extent of as electorate MP. As 
mentioned above. the ability to express independent views is limited by non-binding 
party rules. An MP may differ with his or her Caucus where there is agreement that 
75 Ministry of Justice "Electoral (Integrity) Amendment Bill Report of the Ministry of Justice" EIA 
J/3, 7. 
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the vote will be a free-vote, or where the MP must vote according to the interests 
of his or her electorate. It is apparent, that these rules will need to be modified in an 
MMP environment, as reference to constituency interests will have to be interpreted 
broadly if it is to accommodate the interests of list MPs. It will be easier for an 
electorate MP to rely on the second exception. Take for example Hon D Conner, 
MP who consistently votes contrary to his party when his West Coast Electorate is 
adversely affected by government actions. There is a clear link between his vote and 
the interests of his electorate. 
2. How does the doctrine of Independence of Members of Parliament 
operate as a restraint on Executive Power? 
In the past, the likelihood of a backbencher revolt was rare, "Under the 
domination of a two-party system, where party discipline was exceedingly strict, as 
it has been in New Zealand from 1935 until 1993, this possibility was remote and 
theoretical".77 However, under MMP, it is likely to be more common. Where the 
Government, is a coalition or minority government, all governing parties will expect 
to be consulted on politically significant items of government business. This will 
mean that Caucus may need to sacrifice some policies in order to accommodate 
other parties. "The authority of one caucus .. . will be limited by the need to secure 
the agreement of coalition partners and their caucuses". 
78 
In an MMP environment. a unified Caucus is important. Once a party has 
taken a stance, the Party Leader must be assured that the position is supported so 
that he or she can effectively negotiate with other parties on the basis of that 
position. This will mean that the role of the Party Leader must change. Effective 
Government will be determined by a leader's ability to manage his or her Caucus. A 
divided Caucus threatens the stability of Government itself, potentially vetoing an 
agreement between coalition partners in Cabinet. 
The role of the Party Leader must change accordingly. To ensure adequate 
support, consultation must take place with all concerned. This means, that it is no 
76 For example Alamein Kopu . 
77 Palmer, Geoffrey and Palmer Matthew Bridled Power: New Zealand Government Under MMP (3 
ed, Auckland University Press, Auckland, 1997) 7. 
78 Richard Mulgan Politics in New Zealand (2 ed , Auckland University Press, Auckland, 1997), 113 . 
longer possible for Cabinet to make independent decisions, and then dictate them 
to its respective Caucus or Caucuses. 
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Ironically, the introduction of the Electoral (Integrity) Amendment Bill 
brought about a situation where this occurred. When the Bill was originally 
submitted to the Select Committee, Labour had the full support of its backbenchers. 
However, in April this year, when negotiations were taking place regarding the 
possible content of a SOP, at least ten Labour MPs expressed their disapproval of 
the Bill. 79 Mr Tamihere said at the time. " ... they might have to vote with the 
Opposition to defeat the Bill". 
80 In their eyes the proposed changes made the Bill 
"constitutionally unacceptable". 
81 Without the support of these MPs, the legislation 
would not be passed, however, according to a recent press release. it now appears 
that this situation has been resolved. 
82 
Thus the Bill itself is clear evidence that under MMP the dissenting voice of 
a few MPs can have a powerful effect on Cabinet's ability to see Government 
legislation passed. This is evidence of the new "unpredictable" nature of MMP, the 
implication is that FPP-style party leadership and party discipline may not be 
appropriate under MMP. It is my view that this Bill has been introduced in an 
attempt to increase party discipline, and thereby make the job of the Party Leader 
easier. Hon M Wilson, AG, when introducing the Bill to the house said:
83 
While individual rights of members of this House must be respected, so must the 
principle of proportionality, because that now lies at the heart of our electoral 
law. This Govt has a responsibility to promote political stability, and that is the 
primary purpose of this Bill. 
The Bill represents a desire to enforce party discipline through law, thereby 
increasing stability. This will be at the expense of the principle of independence of 
MPs, and therefore Parliament's ability to constrain the executive. 
---·- -------
79 Brent Edwards, Ruth Berry "Rebel MPs told to toe line" ( I March 200 I) Evening Post, Wellington, 
I. 
80 Johnathan Milne "Backbench Challenge to Deal" (I March 2001) The Dominion Wellington 2. 
81 Johnathan Milne above n 80. 
82 
New Zealand Government "Party Hopping To End" ( 18 September 200 I, I 0.50am 200 I) Press 
Release. 
83 (22 December 1999) 518 NZPD, 64 per Hon M Wilson, AG emphasis added. 
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3. Effect of the Electoral (Integrity) Amendment Bill on the operation 
of the principle of Independence of Members of Parliament 
The effect of this Bill is that it will alter the current balance between the 
doctrine of independence and party discipline, so as to place the doctrine of 
proportionality above that of the ability of Parliament to act as a restraint on the 
power of the Executive. This was expressly acknowledged by the Government upon 
the introduction of the original Bill. Hon M Wilson, AG said:
84 
The Government recognises that this Bill raises a number of important 
constitution issues relating to the appropriate balance to be struck between 
the principle of proportionality of party representation , and the principle of 
independence of individual members of parliament. 
Section 55D of the Bill alters the balance so as to give party discipline the 
force of law, which will effectively operate as a chilling effect on an MPs ability to 
express dissenting views within Parliament. The Bill prevents an MP from acting in 
a way that "distorts and is likely to continue to distort, the proportionality of 
political party representation in Parliament".
85 This language is broad enough to 
potentially include the operation of the conscience vote. While it remains to be seen 
how this section will operate in practice. the mere fact that it could potentially 
operate as a fetter on the ability of an MP to speak out against his or her party makes 
this an undesirable Bill. 
The Bill does provide an opportunity for an MP to defend his or her actions 
under the proposed section 55D(b), where the MP concerned is given 21 days to 
respond to allegations made by the Party Leader. For the reasons noted above,
86 it 
will b.: particularly problematic for a list MP to justify his or her conscience vote. A 
list MP cannot point to the interests of a particular constituency as justifying their 
action. only to a national constituency or class of persons, or their own conscience. 
However, the dangers posed by this Bill apply equally to both list MPs and 
electorate MPs. There is no clear indication in the legislation as to exactly what 
kind of conduct will be deemed to have "distorted" the proportionality of 
Parliament, nor is there any indication as to what justifications can be raised to 
84 (22 December 1999) 518 NZPD, 64. 
85 Supplementary Order Paper number 177, 6 September 200 I, proposed clause 550. 
86 Part III A 2 How does the doctrine of Independence of MPs operate as a restraint on Executive 
Power .? 
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defend an allegation of such conduct. Germany for instance has enshrined the 
principle of Independence of MPs in its constitution; A38 provides that legislators 
must be bound only by their consciences.
87 In New Zealand, it is unclear whether 
this principle is constitutionally recognised. In my view, this principle is of 
constitutional standing, because of its role as a constraint on executive power. 
Accordingly this legislation is un-constitutional. Even if the principle does not have 
constitutional standing, the fettering of freedom of speech alone renders this Bill 
undemocratic and undesirable. 
This Bill breaches sections 13, 14 and 1 7 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights 
Act 1990 (NZBORA) - freedom of thought, conscience and religion; freedom of 
expression; and freedom of association respectively. Proposed section 550 unduly 
limits the ability of an MP to express a dissenting view, and is therefore contrary to 
sections 13 and 14. The fact that the Bill gives Caucus and party leaders the ability 
to expel members from Parliament because they cease to be a member of their party 
is contrary to section 1 7. A member has the right to choose whether or not to 
remain a member of a particular party and they also have the right to resign on a 
matter of principle. 
The Solicitor-General vetted the original Bill for compliance with the 
NZBORA and concluded that no provision in the Bill appeared to be inconsistent 
with any of the rights and freedoms contained in the Bill of Rights. 
88 This 
conclusion was based on the premise that the Bill only applied to voluntary 
resignations and therefore '·the section was drafted in such a way as to minimise its 
impact on manifestations of dissent generally within the Parliamentary process".
89 
The Solicitor-General made it clear that: 
90 
One of the chief concerns in respect of the constitutionality of anti-defection 
laws generally has been the extent to which such law has a chilling effect on 
expression of dissenting views within the political process. The notion that the 
open manifestation of expressions of dissent is vital to healthy democratic 
processes is one of the core propositions underlying the rights which are grouped 
in the Bill of Rights under the heading of"Democratic and Civil Rights". 
87 Solicitor-General " Electoral (Integrity) Amendment Bill 1999 - PCO 3426cl/2: complianc
e with 
New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990" EIA/J/2, para 2. 
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The Solicitor-General went on to say, "Importantly, the legislation does not 
in my opinion create a sanction of a legal kind against Members who speak out 
against their parties, or who vote against them in the House. Control of such matters 
is left to the political forces rather than the legal process".
91 
However, since that statement was made, the SOP. as noted, has made 
substantial changes to the effect of the Bill. It now potentially requires MPs who are 
expelled from their parties to vacate their parliamentary seat, and potentially fetters 
freedom of expression. The implication from the Solicitor-General's original vet is 
that where the Bill is not restricted to voluntary resignation, but acts as a "legal 
sanction" against members who speak out or vote against their parties in the House, 
it would amount to a breach of sections 13, 14 and 1 7. 
Section 5 of the NZBORA provides that rights and freedoms contained in the 
NZBORA may be subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be 
demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society. Currently, the principle of 
independence of MPs as a manifestation of the rights contained in the NZBORA is 
restrained by the non-binding rules of party discipline. This is a justified limit. The 
Solicitor-General stated that control of such matters as speaking out against one's 
party or voting against them in the House is left to the political forces rather than the 
legal process. By implementing this legislation, the Government is giving party 
discipline. the force of law. This is an unjustified limitation on the operation of 
freedom of thought, conscience and religion. freedom of expression and freedom of 
association. The Rt Hon Geoffrey Palmer said, ·'MPs should make honourable 
undertakings, not legal undertakings. They may be coerced by argument, by public 
opinion. but not stand-over tactics in closed rooms by party leaders".
92 The current 
balance provides reasonable limits on the principle of independence, it is undesirable 
that this balance be altered and given the force of law through the Electoral 
(Integrity) Amendment Bill. 
9 1 Solicitor-General above n 87, para 14. 
92 (22 December 1999) 518 NZPD 71 per Hon Rod Donald, MP. 
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C The confidence Vote as a Constraint on Excessive Executive Power 
The convention of Collective Responsibility is essential to a Cabinet system 
of Government.93 The convention of Collective Responsibility is made up of three 
elements, confidence, unanimity, and confidentiality.
94 Of significance to this paper 
is how the element of confidence operates under MMP Government. 
The Confidence element of Collective Responsibility is important because, 
"Cabinet must collectively enjoy the confidence of the House of Representatives in 
order to continue in office ... It gives Parliament the power to make and unmake 
government administrations in addition to its power to make and unmake law". 
95 
Confidence of the House is expressed through a vote of confidence. If a 
Government loses a vote of confidence. "it becomes a caretaker administration 
awaiting either the formation of another Government or a dissolution of Parliament 
and new elections".9
6 Under FPP. the system was biased towards majority 
Governments, with a majority in the house, "retaining the confidence of the House 
was thereby rendered a foregone conclusion".
97 Under MMP however, retaining the 
confidence of the House is far less certain. Under MMP, a majority party is 
unlikely, and therefore, the ability of a Government to retain the confidence of the 
Hous~ is not a foregone conclusion, this is yet another instance_ of the unpredictable 
nature of MMP Government. Accordingly, the ''doctrine of responsibility has found 
new vigour in the g1vmg. and potential taking away, of life to a New Zealand 
Government". 98 
Party hopping is a significant factor in that uncertainty. Where the 
proportional distribution of seats is uncertain and subject to change, the Government 
cannot guarantee that they will retain the confidence of the House for the entire 
term. It will be recalled that Hon M Wilson, AG said, "This Government has a 
93 Cabinet Office Manual 1996, para 3.6. 
94 See further Geoffrey Marshal. ·' Introduction" in Ministerial Responsibility. ed. Geoffrey Marshall 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989). 
95 Professor Matthew S.R Palmer "Ministerial Responsibility versus Chief Executive Accountability" 
conflict or complement?" (Institute for International Research conference on "analysing and 
Understanding Crucial Developments in PUBLIC LAW, Wellington, 4 April 2001). 
96 Geo/'frey Palmer and Matthew Palmer Bridled Power: New Zealand Government Under MMP (3 
ed, Auckland University Press, Auckland, 1997), 3. 
97 Geoffrey Palmer and Matthew Palmer above n 94, 3. 
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responsibility to promote political stability, and that is the primary purpose of this 
Bill".99 I propose that this Bill is an attempt to ensure stability through limiting the 
threat to the Government of losing a vote of confidence. As mentioned earlier. 
instability, or unpredictability, is not a negative concept. but in fact. operates as both 
a check on executive power, and as a means of creating better government, and 
stable policy. Jonathan Boston wrote: 
100 
The possibility that coalitions may shift from one group of parties to another, 
possibly without intervening elections being held, means that 'policy stability ' 
and the keeping of 'international commitments' cannot be entirely guaranteed. 
When control of the Treasury benches changed from National to Labour (or vice 
versa) under FPP, however there was also an inevitable loss of policy continuity 
- which is not always a bad thing, and in some instances precisely what electors 
voted for. 
Party hopping and alterations to the proportional distribution of seats is not 
the only way in which a party can lose the confidence of the House. Other such 
causes include. the inability to gather enough support from other parties, or where a 
coalition party, or supporting party withdraws its support. or where there is a party 
split, or divided Cabinet. 
It is also important to note that a minority Government will not lose a vote of 
confidence as a matter of course. The new Standing Orders 
101 allow parties to 
abstain in a confidence vote. Therefore "a government does not require an absolute 
parliamentary majority in order to win a vote of confidence. All that is required is a 
simple (or relative) majority."
102 
Retaining the majority of the House also has the advantage of giving the 
governing party or parties the ability to call an early election. "A government with 
a firm majority can - at least in principle - determine the date of the next election. 
It thus has the potential to seize the opportunity afforded by favourable opinion-poll 
98 Professor Matthew S.R Palmer " Ministerial Responsibility versus Chief Executive Accountability" 
conflict or complement?" (Institute for International Research conference on "analysing and 
Understanding Crucial Developments in PUBLIC LAW, Wellington, 4 April 200 I), 4. 
99 (22 December 200 I) 5 I 8 NZPD 64. 
100 Jonathan Boston, Stephen. Levine, Elizabeth. McLeay, and Nigel S Roberts, (ed) New Zealand 
Under MMP: A New Politics .? (Auckland University Press, Auckland, 1996). 189. 
101 Standing Order 141 (2); New Zealand Parliament, Standing Orders of the House of 
Representatives: brought into force 20 February /996, amended 22 August 1996, amended 8 
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ratings to secure an electoral advantage over its major political rivals".
103 Under 
MMP, the opposite is also true, the Opposition parties, where they can form a 
majOi.'ity, may also seize the opportunity to call an early election. through a motion 
of confidence, again adding to the uncertainty under MMP. 
Changes to the proportionality of Parliament have the potential to pose a real 
threat of losing the confidence of the House. It is interesting to note that the 
opposite can also be true, changes in proportionality may operate to ensure a 
government retains the confidence of the House, even after losing significant 
support. For example, under the first MMP Government, when the National/New 
Zealand First Coalition collapsed, National was able to remain in Government as a 
minority Government due to the support of defecting members from other parties. 
I have discussed the confidence vote in terms of a "threat". This is because, 
in my view, the "likelihood" of a confidence vote under MMP is perhaps no more 
real than under MMP, but the '·threat" that it could now be used to remove a 
government is greater. Theoretically, the possibility of the Opposition removing a 
government through a confidence motion is greater. However, there are a number of 
constraints, which mean that the political reality is that, a motion will only be used 
in rare circumstances. The first constraint is that Opposition parties would have to 
agree to topple the Government. While all are united in opposition of the current 
government, they may not be united in toppling the Government, which can have 
far- reaching effects. For instance, the potential effect on New Zealand's economic 
position will be a relevant consideration. as will party rankings in the polls, which 
will indicate whether an early election may or may not be in a party' s favour. Public 
opinion will also be a factor, it may well be that the public may look unfavourably 
on those parties, which were perceived as creating instability. 
However, the fact remams, that in theory so long as the proportional 
distribution of seats is subject to change during a parliamentary term, a government 
can never be certain that they will be able to retain the confidence of the House for 
the entire term. The confidence vote therefore poses a significant threat; it is this 
threat, which will create better consultative Government and reduce the power of the 
executive over Parliament. The threat of the confidence vote will ensure better 
government. This threat ensures that Party Leaders will keep Caucus informed, and 
103 Boston et al above n I 00, 98. 
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include Caucus in all aspects of policy formulation and negotiation. This will also 
mean that traditional party discipline will have to be altered accordingly. "This may 
make life more difficult for rulers, and it may make life in Parliament more messy. 
But our rulers should not have an easy run: look where it got us before".
104 
The renewed '·vigour" of the confidence vote was not an unexpected result of 
the introduction of MMP. Authors of Bridled Power stated that, "Parliament and 
Opposition parties will determine the continued existence of a minority government. 
If they have a majority, the Opposition parties will be able to topple a minority 
governing party from office through a vote of no confidence in Parliament" .
105 
One of the objectives of MMP was to lessen the power of the executive, by 
increasing the power of Parliament. The threat of a confidence vote is Parliament ' s 
primary means of exerting power over the executive. Any legislation, which would 
affect the ability of Parliament to use or threaten a no-confidence motion, would 
therefore defeat one of the objectives of MMP. 
Thus, this Bill is undesirable. It seeks to prevent party hopping under the 
premise that instability and uncertainty are detrimental to the operation of 
government. American scholars have suggested that "effectiveness ... is not the sole 
purpose of government"
106 Martin Lipset argues that '·effectiveness was not the 
exclusive or perhaps even central objective of the Framers of the American 
Constitution, the American way of life entails a commitment to five core values: 
liberty, egalitarianism, populism and laissez-faire - effective government is not one 
of them''. 107
 It is my argument that a certain degree of unpredictability is necessary 
to ensure that the government remains accountable to the public. It is Parliament ' s 
role, and the role of the individual MP to act as a check on that power. The 
increased vigour of the confidence vote has ensured that Par! iament can act as a real 
constraint on the power of the Executive. In order to retain the support of the 
House, the Executive must actively consult with its backbench MPs. Thus, the 
unpredictable nature of MMP Government will ensure better consultative 
Government. which, was one of the primary objectives of the introduction of MMP. 
104 The Editor, " Important to restore confidence" (28 November 1999) The Sunday Star-Times 
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IV CONCLUSION 
In conclusion therefore, this paper has made three arguments in favour of 
abandoning the Electoral Integrity (Amendment) Bill 1999. The first was that even 
with the SOP amendments, the Bill would not be effective in meeting its twin 
purposes. The second is that even if such legislation were effective, it is simply 
unnecessary. And third, this Bill is constitutionally and democratically undesirable. 
This paper has demonstrated that the primary purpose of this Bill was to 
increase stability within Parliament. This was supported by Hon M Wilson's speech 
at the Bill's first reading. Yet this purpose is not stated in the Bill itself, the Bill 
stated only two purposes; to increase the integrity of Parliament and to maintain the 
proportional distribution of seats within Parliament. This paper has demonstrated 
that the Bill is ineffective in achieving those purposes, and it is undesirable that it 
should achieve the third. The Bill will not be successful in achieving its stated 
purposes because it cannot accommodate for the complexity of an MMP Parliament, 
while party hopping has been shown to detrimentally affect the public's confidence 
in MMP, and the proportional distribution of seats within Parliament, it has also 
been shown to be only one factor causing dissatisfaction with MMP. The Bill 
cannot account for all the factors that have lead to public dissatisfaction with MMP 
and therefore is ineffective. 
This paper also demonstrated that while the Bill may have been thought to be 
necessary in 1999, this is no longer the case. The system has settled down and so far 
there has been no party hopping during the second MMP Government. Statistics 
show a similar experience in Germany, it is therefore likely that party hopping will 
not be common practice now that the system has "bedded-in'·. Further, this paper 
has shown that the traditional mechanism of the triennial election is both an 
effecfve and appropriate method by which to control party hopping. The electorate 
has made it clear that it will not condone party hopping. An MP is aware that the 
public is unlikely to accept their behaviour if they choose to leave their party during 
a parliamentary term. This will ensure that MPs only defect where they are able to 
justify their position to the voting public. 
107 Martin Lipset in Boston above n I 00, 190. 
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Finally, this paper has demonstrated that this Bill is undesirable. This 
paper has acknowledged that MMP has brought about substantial change in the day-
to-day operation of Parliament. But, I have also argued that a certain degree of 
unpredictability is desirable. It ensures that the goals of representative, democratic, 
and accountable government are achieved. Where government is unpredictable, it 
ensures that the executive actively consults Parliament. and ideally this will ensure 
enduring, well thought out policy and therefore greater stability between changes of 
Governments. 
This paper also argues that the principle of Independence of MPs has not 
only survived the change from FPP to MMP, but ensures that Parliament is able to 
constrain the Executive. I have also demonstrated that the principle applies equally 
to list MPs and electorate MPs. The ability of MPs to party hop and act 
independently has ensured that the use of the confidence vote poses a very real 
threat to the government of the day. While the political reality may be that it will 
not necessarily be invoked. the threat is that it could be. and therefore Government 
Party Leaders will have to ensure that they maintain party discipline to secure their 
position as Government. I have also suggested that party discipline is still an 
appropriate and justified limit on the principle of independence of MPs, but that it 
may have to be reconsidered and operate in a different manner under an MMP 
system. The old ways of strict FPP discipline may no longer be appropriate. 
The true purpose underlying this Bill is a desire to make Parliament more 
predictable by increasing party discipline through law so as to limit the ability of a 
few MPs to prevent a government passing laws through independent action. I have 
argued that such legislation is contrary to the NZBORA, and is therefore 
undemocratic and unconstitutional. Legislation which unduly fetters the ability of 
Members of Parliament to dissent from the views of their parties should not become 
law. 
At present, there is every indication that the Bill will become law. This 
would be unfortunate for all of New Zealand . While this paper has focused on the 
effect of the Bill on Parliamentarians, the consequences of such legislation affect all 
members of a free and democratic society. MMP was designed to ensure greater 
democracy and representation with Parliament. This Bill will defeat the purposes 
44 
behind the change from FPP to MMP and is therefore undesirable for all of New 
Zealand. In opposing this Bill, Hon R Pebble, MP said: 108 
The only restraint we have upon the executive from having, in the words of 
Geoffrey Palmer, "Unbridled Power··, is the power of the backbench - the fact that 
the Government has to persuade MPs to vote for it on every single measure. That 
is a very powerful restraint. 
Where a Bill is ineffective, unnecessary and substantially limits the ability of 
Parliament to act as a constraint on the executive. it is undesirable and should not be 
made law. 
108 (22 December 1999) 581 NZPD 68 . 
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